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Abstract—Facial attributes are emerging soft biometrics that
have the potential to reject non-matches, for example, based
on mismatching gender. To be usable in stand-alone systems,
facial attributes must be extracted from images automatically
and reliably. In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective
solution for automatic facial attribute extraction by training
a deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) for each facial
attribute separately, without using any pre-training or dataset
augmentation, and we obtain new state-of-the-art facial attribute
classification results on the CelebA benchmark. To test the
stability of the networks, we generated adversarial images –
formed by adding imperceptible non-random perturbations to
original inputs which result in classification errors – via a
novel fast flipping attribute (FFA) technique. We show that
FFA generates more adversarial examples than other related
algorithms, and that DCNNs for certain attributes are generally
robust to adversarial inputs, while DCNNs for other attributes
are not. This result is surprising because no DCNNs tested to date
have exhibited robustness to adversarial images without explicit
augmentation in the training procedure to account for adversarial
examples. Finally, we introduce the concept of natural adversarial
samples, i.e., images that are misclassified but can be easily turned
into correctly classified images by applying small perturbations.
We demonstrate that natural adversarial samples commonly
occur, even within the training set, and show that many of
these images remain misclassified even with additional training
epochs. This phenomenon is surprising because correcting the
misclassification, particularly when guided by training data,
should require only a small adjustment to the DCNN parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Facial attributes have several interesting properties from a
recognition perspective. First, they are semantically meaning-
ful to humans, which offers a level of interpretation beyond
that achieved by most conventional recognition algorithms.
This allows for novel applications, including descriptive
searches (e.g., “Caucasian female with blond hair”) [6], [8],
[16], verification systems [7], facial ordering [11], social sen-
timent analysis [18], and demographic profiling. Second, they
provide information that is more or less independent of that
distilled by conventional recognition algorithms, potentially
allowing for the creation of more accurate and robust systems,
narrowing down the search space, and increasing efficiency
at match time. Finally, facial attributes are interesting due to
their ability to convey meaningful identity information about a
previously unseen face, e.g., not enrolled in a gallery or used
to train a classifier.
Recent state-of-the-art approaches to facial attribute classi-
fication [10] have leveraged powerful deep learning models,
which derive a generic feature space representation that is
+ =
(a) Fixing a Natural Adversarial on Gender: from female to male
=+
(b) Flipping Age: from young to old
Fig. 1: ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES BY ATTRIBUTE FLIPPING.
This paper demonstrates the problem of natural adversarial samples
and how to generate adversarial examples for attributes by the
novel fast flipping attribute (FFA) technique. Adversarial examples
are formed by adding small, non-random perturbations to original
inputs: while the modifications can remain imperceptible to human
observers, vulnerable machine learning models classify the original
and adversarial examples differently. In (a), we show a natural
adversarial man (misclassified as a woman) that is “corrected” by
an imperceptible perturbation. In (b), we show a correctly classified
young person flipped to “old”. Perturbations are magnified by factor
of 50 to enhance visibility.
optimized for face identification or verification. They then use
the truncated network to extract features upon which to train
per-attribute binary classifiers. Although this approach leads
to a compact representation, it does not explicitly incorporate
attribute information into the learnt feature space. While at-
tributes that relate to facial identity may be implicitly captured
by this representation, there is little evidence to suggest that
the representation will effectively distill non identity related
attribute information, e.g., smiling. On the contrary, intuition
suggests that a network trained to discriminate identities would
learn to ignore non identity related attributes. Motivated by
recent research [9], we hypothesize that by explicitly incorpo-
rating attribute information into deep learning representations,
we can attain superior performance, especially for non identity
related attributes. We provide supporting evidence for this
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hypothesis by advancing the state of the art on the CelebA
benchmark – the largest publicly available attribute dataset
– simply by using separate deep networks, each trained on
raw attribute data. Moreover, unlike the former state-of-the-
art approaches, we are able to attain such high performance
without any form of data augmentation.
While our approach is state of the art on the CelebA
benchmark, recent research [17], [4] raises the question: Does
using pure end-to-end deep networks, i.e., not simply as feature
extractors, but as attribute classifiers themselves, induce a
risk of a non-robust attribute representations for real-world
applications? Specifically, Szegedy et al. [17] discovered that
deep neural networks are susceptible to carefully chosen
perturbations of even a few pixels. By adding such selected
perturbations – that cannot be perceived by humans – to
the original images, the resulting adversarial images become
misclassified with high confidence.
Much research on adversarial images has been conducted
since, and – to our knowledge – all of these images have been
easily generated independently of the dataset, network topol-
ogy, training regime, hyperparameter choice, and activation
type. In our experiments we attempt to generate adversarial
images over a random subset of the CelebA dataset [10] using
the fast gradient sign (FGS) method [4], and a new algorithm
for introducing adversarial images – the fast-flipping attribute
(FFA) algorithm – that efficiently leverages backpropagation
without requiring groundtruth labels. We find that for both
FGS and FFA attribute classifications are difficult to change,
at least for some attributes, and that the number of adversarial
images does not decrease during training.
To date, adversarial images have been presented as inputs
under the presence of slight artificial perturbations where the
original input is correctly classified and the adversarial input
is misclassified. In this paper, we pose the reverse question:
“Do there exist misclassified inputs on which we can induce
small artificial perturbations to correct the classification?”, or
“Do adversarial images naturally occur?” We find that the
answer is yes, there are images in the training set which,
even after they are used for training, are misclassified by
given facial attribute network but can be flipped to the proper
classification via an imperceptible perturbation. Further, we
find that even with additional training, many of these natural
adversarial samples are not learnt by the networks. This is
surprising because correctly learning these natural adversarial
samples should require only a minor adjustment to the network
parameters.
In Fig. 1, we show two examples of adversarial images
that occurred in our experiments. Fig. 1(a) contains a natural
adversarial image of a man (left) that is misclassified as a
woman, where a small perturbation (center) applied to the
image (right) would correct the classification. The reverse is
shown in Fig. 1(b), where a correctly classified young person
(left) is turned into an old person (right) by adding a small
perturbation (center). Note that the real perturbations are much
smaller than shown in Fig. 1, for visualization we magnified
the pixel changes by a factor of 50. Since perturbations can
be positive and negative, gray pixels correspond to no change.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We advance the state of the art on the CelebA attribute
classification benchmark with relative reduction in clas-
sification error of over 25 %.
• We generate adversarial images for each of the attribute
networks and find that our facial attribute networks attain
no additional robustness to adversarial images with longer
training.
• We introduce the notion of natural adversarial images
and analyze their prevalence using our data and networks.
We find that the frequency of naturally occurring adver-
sarial images is quite large, accounting for nearly 73 %
of the training set images that are incorrectly classified
by facial attribute networks.
• We introduce the fast flipping attribute (FFA) algorithm
for adversarial image generation and demonstrate that it
is successful at flipping attribute classifications.
II. ATTRIBUTE CLASSIFICATION
The automatic classification of facial attributes was first pi-
oneered by Kumar et al. [7]. Their classifiers depended heavily
on face alignment and each attribute used learnt combinations
of features from hand-picked facial regions (e.g., cheeks,
mouth, etc.). The feature spaces consisted of various simple
normalizations and aggregations of color spaces and image
gradients. Different features were learnt for each attribute,
and one RBF-SVM per attribute was independently trained
for classification.
More recent approaches leverage deep convolutional neural
networks (DCNNs) to extract features. Liu et al. [10] use three
DCNNs – a combination of two localization networks (LNets)
and an attribute recognition network (ANet) – to first localize
faces and then extract facial attributes. The ANet is first trained
on external data to identify people and then fine-tuned using
all attributes to extract features that are fed into independent
linear SVMs for the final attribute classification. This approach
is the current state of the art on the CelebA dataset.
Contrary to [10] where the feature space is not necessarily
attribute derived, our approach uses one DCNN per attribute,
trained only on the CelebA training set. We use the outputs
of these networks directly as classification results without
requiring secondary classifiers.
A. Network Classification
For our attribute classifiers, we adopted the 16 layer VGG
network topology from [12], with two modifications. First,
we altered the dimension of the RGB image input layer from
224 × 224 pixels to 178 × 218 pixels, the resolution of the
aligned CelebA images. Second, we replaced the final softmax
layer with Euclidean loss on the label. We chose Euclidean loss
– as opposed to softmax, sigmoid, or hinge loss – because
attributes lie along a continuous range, while sigmoids tend
to enforce saturation and hinge-loss enforces a large margin,
neither of which is consistent with our intuition.
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Fig. 2: ATTRIBUTE CLASSIFICATION ERROR ON CELEBA. This figure shows the classification errors on the test set of the CelebA
dataset for Our algorithm compared to three other algorithms, sorted based on the result of Ours. The Trivial approach simply assigns each
attribute the score of the majority class. The results of FaceTracer and LNets+ANet are taken from Liu et al. [10].
For an image x with label y ∈ {−1,+1} indicating the
absence or presence of an attribute, respectively, let f(x) be
the DCNN classification decision. Then the loss J is:
J(θ, x, y) = ||f(x)− y||2, (1)
where θ are the parameters of the DCNN model.
To maintain comparability with other research reporting on
the same dataset, and since the dataset only contains binary
attribute labels, we decided to apply a classification function to
the network output that was trained with Euclidean loss. For
input x, the classification result c(x) and its corresponding
error e(x, y) are obtained by thresholding f(x) at 0:
c(x)=
{
+1 if f(x)>0
−1 otherwise, e(x, y)=
{
0 if y ·c(x)>0
1 otherwise.
(2)
The classification error over the whole dataset X of N
images with attribute labels Y is then given by:
E(X,Y ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
e(Xn, Yn)
)
. (3)
B. Experiments
We conducted a comparison of our separate per-attribute
neural networks with other attribute algorithms on the CelebA
dataset [10]. CelebA consists of more than 200K images
which show faces in a variety of different facial expressions,
occlusions and illuminations, and poses from frontal to full
profile. Approximately 160K images are used for training, and
the remaining 40K images are equally split up into validation
and test sets. Each image is annotated with binary labels of
40 facial attributes. We conducted our evaluation using the set
of pre-cropped face images included in the dataset, which are
aligned using hand-annotated key-points.
Due to memory limitations, we set the training batch size to
64 images per training iteration. Thus, the training requires ap-
proximately 2500 iterations to run a full epoch on the training
set. In opposition to [12], we did not incorporate any dataset
augmentation or mirroring; we trained networks purely on the
aligned images. We selected a learning rate of 10−5. During
training, we updated DCNN weights using an RMSProp update
rule with an inverse learning rate decay policy. Using the GPU
implementation of Caffe [5], we trained all 40 networks until
convergence on the validation set, which occurred between
two and ten epochs depending on the attribute.
A comparison of our results on the CelebA test set with the
original FaceTracer approach by Kumar et al. [7] as well as
the LNets+ANet state-of-the-art approach of Liu et al. [10]
is shown in Fig. 2. Due to the highly biased distributions
of attribute labels in the CelebA dataset, we also included a
Trivial algorithm, which simply predicts the class with the
higher occurrence in the training set. For some attributes
such as Attractive or Male (which are approximately balanced
in the test set), the Trivial classifier obtains high errors,
while for attributes like Narrow Eyes or Double Chin, the
Trivial classifier even outperforms the previous state-of-the-
art approach. Our networks are at least able to outperform the
Trivial approach for all attributes, which is not true for the
other two approaches.
Our approach yields a mean classification error of 9.20 %,
a relative improvement of 27.5 % over the state-of-the-art
(12.70 % classification error) and 51 % improvement over the
FaceTracer system (18.88 % classification error). Interestingly,
we are “only” 54 % better (in terms of relative improvement)
than the Trivial system, which obtains 19.96 % mean classifi-
cation error. For certain attributes, especially those not related
to face identity (e.g., Wearing Necklace, Wearing Earrings,
Blurry), our approach dramatically advances the state of the
art. LNets+ANet outperforms our approach only for a few
attributes, but never by more than a percentage point in
classification error.
III. ADVERSARIAL IMAGES FOR ATTRIBUTES
An adversarial image is an image which looks very close
to (and is generally indistinguishable from) an original image
from the perspective of a human observer, but differs dramat-
ically in classification by a machine learnt classifier. Multiple
techniques have been proposed to create adversarial exam-
ples. The first reliable technique [17] uses a box-constrained
optimization (L-BFGS). Starting with a randomly chosen
modification, it aims to find the smallest perturbation in the
input space that causes the perturbed image to be classified as
a predefined target label. Baluja et al. [1] proposed generating
affine perturbations, applying them to input samples, and then
observing how models respond to these perturbed images.
While, from an adversarial perspective, this approach has the
advantage of not requiring internal network representations, it
relies on “guess and check”, i.e., it creates random perturba-
tions and determines if the results are misclassified, which can
be prohibitively expensive.
Goodfellow et al. [4] introduced a more efficient algorithm
to produce adversarial perturbations. Their fast gradient sign
(FGS) method creates perturbations by using the sign of the
gradient of loss with respect to the input. FGS is more efficient
than L-BFGS because it requires only one gradient which can
be effectively calculated via backpropagation, while L-BFGS
needs multiple. Experiments demonstrate that FGS reliably
causes a wide variety of learning models to misclassify their
perturbed inputs, including “shallow” models, but that deep
networks are especially susceptible [4]. Note that FGS is based
directly upon network information. The gradient of loss defines
the direction, while a line-search is used to determine the
magnitude necessary to make the perturbed input adversarial
with minimal deviation from the original.
Although the definitions of adversarial example vary [17],
[4], [1], at their core, adversarial examples are modified inputs
formed by imperceptible non-random perturbations that are
misclassified by machine learning models. Hence, humans
should not even perceive differences between adversarial and
original inputs. To formalize the definition, let x be an input
image correctly classified as y. An adversarial perturbation η
is given if the perturbed image x˜ = x+ η is not classified as
y:
f(x) = y and f(x˜) 6= y. (4)
This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition as the
modification needs to be imperceptible. Various measures such
as L1, L2, or L∞ distances have been used to show how
close the perturbed images are to their originals. However,
these measures are not well matched to human perception
[15] as they are very sensitive to even small geometric
distortions that may still result in plausible images. Instead, we
seek a measure of similarity in a psychophysical sense. The
perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS) [13] measures
similarity S(x˜, x) based on structural photometric-invariant
differences, by first performing a homography alignment to
maximize the enhanced correlation coefficient (ECC) [2] be-
tween the perturbed image and the original, then computing
the structural similarity index (SSIM) [3] between the aligned
images. The homography transform removes differences due
to plausible looking translations and rotations, while SSIM
tends to measure only structural differences not stemming from
perturbations that appear as plausible photometric differences.
We believe that the resultant PASS score is a more suitable
measure of the degree to which an image is adversarial.
Consistent with [3], we adopt the PASS threshold τ = 0.95
as a cutoff for adversarial.
A. Adversarial Image Generation
We explore two approaches for generating the necessary
perturbations η. Goodfellow et al. [4] introduced the fast
gradient sign (FGS) method to find adversarial perturbations.
Given an image x, FGS searches for perturbations causing
mislabeling using the sign of the gradient of loss:
η
fgs
= w sign
(∇xJ(θ, x, y)) . (5)
FGS takes steps in the direction that is defined by the
gradient of loss in order to cause mislabeling. This requires
knowledge of the label y of the image x. We introduce a
novel approach – the fast flipping attribute (FFA) algorithm
– that directly relies on the (binary) classification scores. We
postulate that inverting the classification score and calculating
the gradient of the inverted score with respect to the input
image will eventually provide a direction where adversarial
perturbations can be found. Formally:
η
ffa
= −w ∂f(x)
∂x
(6)
can be obtained by backpropagating the inverted classification
score from the decision layer, i.e., the layer that calculates
f(x).
By using FGS or FFA, we can obtain directions that
define varying perturbations η with respect to a given input
image x. To effectively search along those directions for the
smallest perturbations that cause classification errors, we apply
a line-search technique with increasing step sizes to reach the
weight w in Eqns. (5) and (6) that causes mislabeling. By
doubling the step size after each step, those directions can
be quickly discovered. When the line-search oversteps and
the classification of the perturbed example changes, we apply
a binary search within the latest section of the line-search
to find the smallest possible adversarial perturbation. Due
to these enhancements, adversarial generation with FFA and
FGS approaches achieve comparable computational efficiency.
The generated adversarial images have rounded discrete pixel
values in range [0, 255].
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Fig. 3: ADVERSARIAL SUCCESS. This figure shows the success rates of FGS and FFA adversarial generation for adversarial examples
(correctly classified images, +) and natural adversarial samples (incorrectly classified images, −) generated on the converged networks
trained with Euclidean loss, sorted by success rate of FGS+ and based on 1000 images randomly selected from the CelebA training set.
B. Natural Adversarial Images
As of today, adversarial images have been artificially gen-
erated via a computational process, but no one – to our
knowledge – has yet addressed whether adversarial inputs
occur among natural images: are there misclassified images
for which infinitesimal changes to inputs yield correct clas-
sifications? If so, this has tremendous ramifications on the
sensitivity and robustness of decision boundaries. We seek to
explore how often adversarial images naturally occur. Thus,
we formalize the novel concept of natural adversarial images.
Let x′ be an incorrectly classified image whose correct label
is y. Then x′ is a natural adversarial image if there exists
a perturbation η′ such that perturbed image x˜′ = x′ + η′ is
correctly classified as y:
f(x′) 6= y and f(x˜′) = y, (7)
under the premise that S(x˜′, x′) < τ . Hence, a natural
adversarial sample is an image that is misclassified, but that
will be correctly classified when an imperceptible modification
is applied. Interestingly, the same processes used to generate
adversarial images can be used to analyze if a misclassified
input is a natural adversarial.
C. Experiments
To test and compare adversarial generation with FGS and
FFA, we randomly selected 1000 images of the CelebA
training set and performed experiments trying to flip attributes.
For each attribute and both the correctly and incorrectly
classified images, we counted the number of times in which
an adversarial image could be created, i.e., where an η exists
for which S(x, x + η) < τ , for an η generated by either of
the two algorithms. The results per attribute can be obtained
in Fig. 3. Interestingly, for some attributes such as Big Nose
or Young, most input images can be turned adversarial, while
for others like Wavy Hair or Wearing Necklace, adversarial
samples cannot be formed at all. Even more astonishingly,
incorrectly classified images can be turned into adversarial
examples more often than correctly classified images. Also,
the number of images, for which we could generate adversarial
images using FFA is generally higher than for FGS, where
almost all images that spawned FGS adversarial images also
spawned FFA adversarial images.
In an attempt to test in which stage of the network training
more adversarial images exist, we also tried to generate
adversarial images for the same 1000 examples on DCNNs
that were trained for two epochs. Intuition would suggest
that DCNNs are able to learn adversarial samples that exist
at two epochs, and the total number of adversarial images
would decrease. Especially for natural adversarial images,
i.e., images that were misclassified by DCNNs at two epochs
for which imperceptible modifications to those images would
make them correct, we assume that further training would
make the networks learn these examples. The results of these
experiments, which are listed in detail in the top half of Tab. I,
are counter-intuitive. For FGS, the total number of adversarial
images over all attributes that we were able to create slightly
increased from 8827 to 10587, while more than half of the
images (5884) were in both sets (which includes images that
were misclassified before and now classified correctly and vice
versa). For FFA, the numbers for DCNNs at two epochs and
after convergence are similar, and for most vulnerable input
images we could create adversarial samples on both converged
and unconverged networks.
In general, the total number of incorrectly classified images
Loss Adv. Type Two Epochs Converged Overlap
Euclidean
FGS+ 6393 8345 4616
FGS− 2434 2242 1268
FFA+ 13621 13268 9881
FFA− 2918 2753 1639
Softmax
FGS+ 6833 12047 5896
FGS− 2385 2431 1315
FFA+ 16371 21218 15259
FFA− 2844 2573 1721
TABLE I: ADVERSARIAL IMAGES. This table shows the numbers
of FGS and FFA adversarial images generated on models at two
epochs and after convergence, trained with either Euclidean or
softmax loss. We show numbers for adversarial examples (correctly
classified images, +) and natural adversarial samples (incorrectly
classified images, −) over all attributes. The overlap represents the
number of images that are sources of adversarial instances both at
two epochs and after convergence.
for which adversarial samples could be created was consistent
between two epochs and convergence, though at least half
of the original input images differed. This also means that
half of the images, for which an imperceptible modification
would have been sufficient to classify them correctly, were not
corrected with additional training. At least we found that of
the 1279 images that were natural FFA adversarial samples
at two epochs and that are not natural adversarial samples on
the converged networks, the majority (1048) were classified
correctly by the converged networks. The numbers for FGS
are similar.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we employed a simple and effective method
to train deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) to per-
form binary facial attribute classification. Experiments on the
CelebA dataset show that with 9.20 % average classification
error our approach outperforms the current state of the art
(12.70 %). This performance gain is statistically significant,
resulting in p < 10−27 in a paired T-test. Afterward, we
introduced the fast flipping attribute (FFA) algorithm, a fast
and robust method to generate adversarial images by flipping
the binary decision of the DCNN. We demonstrated that FFA
can create more adversarial examples than the related fast
gradient sign (FGS) method, but it has the limitation – by
design – that it can only be applied to binary classification
networks.
In Sec. III, we demonstrated that a greater number of train-
ing epochs does not make DCNNs more robust to adversarial
images. On the other hand, at two epochs DCNNs obtained
an average classification error of 9.78 % that is statistically
significantly (p < 10−10 in the paired T-test) higher than the
9.20 % that we obtained with the converged DCNNs.
A natural question is, to what extent do adversarial inputs
generated on one facial attribute network affect classifications
by other networks. To test this, we tried to create adversarial
examples on a network for one attribute and evaluated whether
these perturbed inputs influence other attributes as well. The
results are shown in Fig. 4. For these experiments, we used
the same 1000 images and report the average percentage of
cross-attribute portability.
On the left, we present the portability of adversarial samples
between the converged networks. Interestingly, most of the
perturbations for one attribute do not influence other attributes.
However, for some attributes we can observe higher correla-
tions. For example, 26 % of the adversarial samples for Goatee
also flip No Beard, and adversarial samples created for several
attributes like Chubby, Double Chin, Pale Skin, and Young
influence the Attractive attribute. For certain attributes, like
Wearing Earrings and Wearing Hat, we were not able to create
adversarial samples; hence, these columns are empty.
On the right of Fig. 4, we report the results of a similar
experiment. We created adversarial examples on the two epoch
networks and checked if they were still adversarial on the
converged networks. On the diagonal, we can see how many
adversarial inputs created on the two epoch networks remained
adversarial on the converged DCNNs. Note that the Narrow
Eyes network had already converged after two epochs.
On average, more than 30 % of the adversarial images
were not learnt by the networks, i.e., the same small per-
turbations still caused misclassifications. Notably, the cross-
attribute portability of adversarial samples even increased, e.g.,
around 50 % of the adversarial images created on the Pale
Skin network at two epochs flipped the classification of the
converged Heavy Makeup network.
In Sec. II, we chose an uncommon loss function – Euclidean
loss – to train our DCNNs. A key rationale for choosing this
loss function is that in parallel attribute research [14] we found
that an extension of the Euclidean loss function was the most
trivial way to incorporate multi-label domain adaptive loss,
making single-label Euclidean loss networks a natural point of
comparison for that work. Readers might ask which loss func-
tion leads to better classification performance: Euclidean or
softmax? To answer this question, we conducted experiments,
training attribute classification networks using softmax loss.
Compared to Euclidean loss networks, DCNNs trained with
softmax loss ended up with a slightly higher classification error
of 9.30 %, which is not statistically significant (p ≈ 0.0003
in a paired T-test). Also, we found that DCNNs trained with
softmax loss are more vulnerable to adversarial examples.
As detailed in Tab. I, using the same 1000 examples from
the CelebA training set (cf. Sec. III) we can generate 16021
adversarial samples (over all 40 attributes) using FFA on the
converged DCNNs trained with Euclidean loss, and 23791
using FFA on softmax loss DCNNs. This is consistent with
other research which demonstrates that DCNNs trained with
softmax loss are generally vulnerable to adversarial examples.
Since all attributes leverage a shared representation in a
multi-label network [14], flipping one attribute label has the
potential side effect of changing more labels of other corre-
lated attributes. We leave further analysis of mixed-objective
adversarial generation to future work. In order to further
improve the overall performance of our networks, future work
can also consider fine-tuning trained DCNN models with
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Fig. 4: ADVERSARIAL PORTABILITY. This figure shows the adversarial portability of attributes throughout networks. On the left, FFA
adversarial images created on the converged networks of a given attribute are tested on all converged networks. On the right, FFA adversarial
images created on networks after two epochs are tested on the fully converged networks. All networks were trained using Euclidean loss.
adversarial samples or hard positives [13], corrected natural
adversarial samples, or even augmented natural adversarial
samples containing perturbations with lower magnitudes than
otherwise needed for correcting misclassifications.
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